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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robin Belden appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence for possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver, and specifically challenges the district court's denial of 
his motion to suppress the State's evidence. This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify 
that, contrary to the State's assertion, the evidence presented to the magistrate in this 
case was not sufficient to support a determination of probable cause to search the 
private home located at space 25 of the mobile home park. 
More specifically, there was no nexus established between the particular space 
to be searched - the home at space 25 - and the underlying allegation of criminal 
activity. Contrary to the State's suggestion, the mere allegation that the defendant was 
in possession of a quantity of drugs with the intent to deliver, or that the defendant was 
suspected of making a drug sale of a relatively small quantity of marijuana with no 
known prior history of drug dealing, is not sufficient to create probable cause to believe 
that there will be evidence of a crime in the defendant's home. Beyond this erroneous 
claim, there is not even sufficient evidence to rise to the level of probable cause to 
believe that Mr. Belden was in fact the person who had supposedly sold the confidential 
informant marijuana on the night of the controlled buy. The only information inculpating 
Mr. Belden in the alleged controlled drug buy came solely from the confidential 
informant - an informant whose veracity could not be verified by police and who has a 
powerful motive to implicate another in order to reduce her own charges. 
Moreover, proximity of Mr. Belden's home to the place where drug activity was 
suspected to have occurred is not sufficient to establish the required nexus. Given that 
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there is no nexus between the underlying allegations of criminal activity set forth by the 
State at both warrant hearings and Mr. Belden's residence, there was a legally 
insufficient basis from which the magistrate - and the district court reviewing the 
magistrate's determination - could have found probable cause. 
In addition, while defense counsel did not make a formal request for a Franks1 
hearing in this case, counsel did allege that the magistrate relied on false information in 
issuing both warrants. This raised the substance of an allegation of a Franks violation 
and the record on its face is sufficient for this Court to determine that a Franks violation 
had occurred. Therefore, this issue is preserved and is justiciable by this Court 
regarding the improper reliance on materially false information, presented with at least 
reckless disregard for its falsity, in issuing the search warrant for space 25 in this case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Belden's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Belden's motion to suppress the State's 
evidence based upon a lack of probable cause to support the warrant issued for 
Mr. Belden's residence? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Belden's Motion To Suppress The State's 
Evidence Based Upon A Lack Of Probable Cause To Support The Warrant Issued For 
Mr. Belden's Residence 
A. Introduction 
There was insufficient evidence adduced at both warrant hearings to establish 
probable cause to search Mr. Belden's residence. Contrary to the implication made by 
the State, proximity to the area where criminal activity is believed to have occurred 
cannot stand as a basis to establish probable cause to search a home. Additionally, 
probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed a criminal offense, without 
more, does not generally provide probable cause to search the defendant's home. 
Here, there was not even sufficient evidence to rise to the level of probable 
cause to believe that Mr. Belden was the person who participated in the controlled drug 
buy that served as the basis for the search warrant. Even if there were, there was no 
evidence that Mr. Belden had ever sold drugs to anyone prior to the controlled drug buy, 
and the evidence of his alleged drug possession and sale during the buy does not 
establish that Mr. Belden was a regular drug trafficker. In sum, there was insufficient 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, to sustain a finding of probable cause to search 
Mr. Belden's residence at space 25 of the trailer park. 
B. Based Upon The Facts Presented At Both Warrant Hearings, There Was An 
Insufficient Nexus Established Between The Criminal Activity Alleged And The 
Residence Located At Space 25 Of The Mobile Home Park To Support A Finding 
Of Probable Cause 
The State argues that, because the State's evidence indicated that the alleged 
controlled drug buy occurred "at some other trailer in the same park," and "Spot 25 was 
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two trailers away," this circumstantial evidence permitted the probable cause 
determination made regarding space 23 to be automatically shifted over to space 25. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State cites no authority for the proposition that it is 
sufficient to merely demonstrate that a drug transaction occurred in the same general 
neighborhood in order to establish probable cause for a particular home located there, 
nor for the idea that mere proximity of a home to suspected criminal activity provides 
constitutional carte blanche to search private homes nearby. This is likely because this 
assertion is unsupported by law. 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected the very idea that mere proximity 
to suspected criminal activity meets with the particularity requirement of the warrants 
clause. According to the Supreme Court in State v. Yoder, one of the primary 
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment is the requirement that a warrant describe with 
particularity the place to be searched. State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 653, 534 P.2d 771, 
773 (1975). And one of the primary purposes for this requirement is so that, "the 
property to be searched is recognizable from other neighboring properties." Id. 
(emphasis added). (See also Appellant's Brief, pp.15-17.) Therefore, it contravenes 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment to fail to delimit the place to be searched so 
as to make certain that neighboring properties are not swept into the search area. 
Also, as noted in the Appellant's Brief, mere proximity to an area where a 
criminal act is observed or believed to have occurred in insufficient to provide the 
requisite nexus between criminal activity and the place to be searched. U.S. v. 
Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004); Janis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 649, 
651-653 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). (See also Appellant's Brief, p.14.) 
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The second potential source for probable cause that the State posits is that, "the 
[drug] transaction certainly happened with someone, and the identified person was 
Belden." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The only person who made any identification of 
Mr. Belden as the person involved in the drug buy was the unnamed confidential 
informant. And the State makes a crucial and an erroneous assumption that there were 
sufficient indicia of reliability of the informant's account of the transaction to give rise to 
probable cause to believe that Mr. Belden was the person involved in the controlled 
drug buy. 
As noted in the Appellant's Brief, police could not vouch for the veracity of this 
unnamed confidential informant, and the informant had a critical motive to implicate 
someone else criminally - she was seeking to reduce her own drug charges. (5/2/07 
Search Warrant Hearing, p.1, L.22 - p.2, L.16; Appellant's Brief, pp.24-26.) The State 
claims that this informant's "credibility was well-established by the police who listened in 
on the transaction and the accuracy of the other information provided by the informant." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) However, this assertion fails for two reasons. 
First, the officers observed nothing of the transaction and could not identify the 
person who allegedly sold the informant a small quantity of marijuana based on the 
audio recording. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing, p.3, Ls.11-20, p.4, Ls.5-7.) The 
officer who testified at the warrant hearing could not identify Mr. Belden's voice on the 
audio recording, nor did he have any visual surveillance of the drug buy. (5/2/07 Search 
Warrant Hearing, p.3, Ls.11-20, p.4, Ls.5-7.) The only information that the officer could 
provide was that he heard an "adult male voice," that was older than the confidential 
informant - whose age is a complete mystery from the record. (5/2/07 Search Warrant 
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Hearing, p.4, Ls.2-4.) The most that the audio recording established was that the 
confidential informant - who was already facing drug charges - was capable of 
procuring drugs. And this is nothing more than what police should have known given 
the charges faced by the informant. 
Second, the State fails to identify what "other information" that it believes the 
unnamed informant accurately supplied to police in support of issuing the warrant. 
What the record reflects is that the details provided by the informant were different than 
what police encountered when they searched the home that they supposedly observed 
the drug buy take place in. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing, p.1, Ls.19-
25.) The officer asserted that the residence searched "didn't match the sketch given to 
us by the informant," that a bill on a counter in the residence in space 23 was addressed 
to an unrelated person, and that the informant may have provided the wrong house 
number. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing, p.1, Ls.19-25.) The information 
adduced at the second warrant hearing actually establishes the inaccuracy of the 
confidential informant's information. 
The State also fails to acknowledge the overarching principle recognized in Idaho 
that "there must be some facts, in addition to the finding of probable cause that the 
person has committed a crime, which would support a finding that there is a fair 
probability that the items sought are in the location which the officers seek to search." 
State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 644, 873 P.2d 891, 898 (Ct. App. 1993); see also 
State v. Sholes, 120 Idaho 639, 642, 818 P.2d 343, 346 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Commonwealth v. Pina, 902 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Mass. 2008) (probable cause to expect 
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that drugs will be present in a home is not established solely by the fact that the 
defendant lives there). 
The State attempts to rely on a narrow exception to this general rule - that, 
where there is specific evidence that a defendant is engaged in regular and large-scale 
drug trafficking, this may give rise to probable cause to search the defendant's home. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8; see also Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) However, as also noted 
in the Appellant's Brief, the facts in this case do not fall within the purview of this 
exception. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) 
In Idaho, there must be evidence not only that the defendant sold drugs, but that 
he was a regular drug trafficker. State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 287, 141 P.3d 1147, 
1156 (Ct. App. 2006). In the survey of cases provided by the court in O'Keefe, the 
cases wherein probable cause to believe the defendant was a regular drug trafficker, all 
Shared the common feature of evidence that demonstrated either a massive quantity of 
drugs, or testimony that the defendant had engaged in prior drug deals coupled with 
other evidence - such as drug ledgers - that showed an ongoing pattern, rather than 
isolated incident, of drug sales. Id. at 288, 141 P.3d at 1157. The court then went on to 
hold that, "In the case of drug traffickers, such inferences can be reasonable given the 
large quantities of drugs and the additional items of property typically involved, such as 
customer lists, sales records, manufacturing equipment and materials, packaging, 
scales, weapons, and large amounts of cash." Id. at 288-289, 141 P.3d at 1157-1158. 
In this case, there was no evidence presented that Mr. Belden had ever sold 
drugs to anyone prior to the controlled drug buy that allegedly occurred with the 
confidential informant at space 23. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing, p.2, L.12 - p.3, 
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L.10.) What was established was that the confidential informant told police that she 
believed that Mr. Belden would sell her pot, and that, due to the fact that the informant 
was herself facing drug charges at the time, she presumably would know from whom 
she could get drugs. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing, p.2, L.12 - p.3, L.10.) Moreover, 
the evidence of Mr. Belden's alleged drug franchise consisted of a statement by the 
confidential informant that Mr. Belden had almost an ounce of pot that he kept in a bag, 
along with a scale. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing, p.6, Ls.13-17.) 
The facts of this case are similar to those in the case of State v. Mische, 448 
N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1989). In Mische, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that 
evidence showing that a person had engaged in a drug transaction at another location, 
his parents' home, could not support a finding of probable cause to believe that there 
would be evidence of illegal drug activity in the defendant's home. Id. at 422. 
In Mische, the officers had actually personally observed the defendant engaging 
in a drug transaction with an informant - a verifying fact not present in this case. Id. at 
416. The informant also told police that the defendant had previously sold the informant 
drugs on prior occasions, which is also a fact not reflected in the record in this case. Id. 
Based on the officer's personal observations of the drug transaction, coupled with the 
information provided by the informant that he had bought drugs from the defendant at 
that location on a previous occasion, police obtained a search warrant for the house 
where the drug buy occurred. Id. 
Unfortunately, this was not the defendant's house - it was his parents' home. Id. 
When police did not discover the evidence that they were looking for, and when they 
found out that the defendant lived at another location, they applied for a new warrant. 
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Id. In this application, another officer added his own affidavit averring that, based on the 
officer's training and experience, he believed that evidence of drugs would be found at 
the defendant's house, and that a second informant had confirmed that he had also 
bought drugs from the defendant at the defendant's home. Id. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that this information was not sufficient to 
establish probable cause to search the defendant's home. The Mische Court first noted 
that the information provided to the magistrate furnished no details to show how the 
informants had information about any criminal activity at the defendant's residence. Id. 
at 418. As does Idaho, North Dakota also recognizes that circumstances surrounding 
regular drug trafficking, coupled with the demonstrated specialized knowledge of an 
officer in matters related to regular drug trafficking, can sometimes give rise to probable 
cause to search a home in the absence of a direct nexus between the criminal activity 
and the place to be searched. Id. at 419-421. But the Mische Court determined that 
there was a lack of specific and reliable evidence in that case to support such an 
inferential leap. 
First, the Mische Court noted that the general conclusion that individuals who 
regularly traffic in controlled substances keep those substances at their home, without 
any particular substantiation regarding the defendant, was "highly suspect." Id. at 421. 
Moreover, the information supplied by both confidential informants was "nothing more 
than conclusory information provided by unidentified people." Id. In light of the facts of 
that case, the Mische Court determined that, "It seems apparent that after the search of 
the [parents'] residence did not reveal the contraband, the officers were on a 'fishing 
expedition' prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." Id. The court ultimately held that: 
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... something additional and more objective than the facile conclusion that 
contraband is ordinarily kept in the home should be required to establish 
probable cause to search that home, particularly where, as here, it is 
apparent that the officers believed that the contraband was in a particular 
place, the [parents') residence, and that only after a search of that 
residence did not reveal the contraband did the officers rely on their 
training and knowledge to justify a search of the [defendant's] residence. 
In view of Mische's activities, the officers may very well have been 
suspicious that contraband was present in any place he frequented. But 
suspicion, without anything more specific, does not amount to probable 
cause to search the [defendant's] residence. 
Id. at 422. 
In this case, the proof set forth by the State at both warrant hearings failed to 
establish probable cause that Mr. Belden was even the individual who had participated 
in the controlled drug buy. There was likewise no proof that Mr. Belden was a regular 
drug trafficker, or that he had ever sold drugs prior to the controlled buy. There was 
simply no nexus established between the criminal activity suspected and the place that 
police ultimately sought to search - the home located at space 25. Because of this, the 
denial of Mr. Belden's motion to suppress was in error. 
C. The Issue Of Whether The Warrant Issued In This Case Was Issued In Reliance 
Upon Materially False Information, Presented With At Least A Reckless 
Disregard For Truth, If Not Done So Knowingly, Was Preserved For Appeal: And 
The Record In This Case Is Sufficient For This Court To Render A Determination 
That A Franks Violation Occurred 
The State has asserted that Mr. Belden's assertions regarding the Franks 
violation were not preserved for appeal. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) However, although 
trial counsel never requested a Franks hearing in this case, counsel did raise the issue 
of the Franks violation. And, given the record in this case, there is no reasonable 
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explanation short of a reckless disregard for truth of the false information provided to the 
magistrate. 
In his Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, Mr. Belden asserted that the 
information provided to the district court, that the police officers saw the drug transaction 
take place at space 23, was erroneous. (Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, p.4.) 
Because this was false information, Mr. Belden further asserted that it could not be used 
as a basis to support a finding of probable cause. (Brief in Support of Motion to 
Suppress, pp.4-5.) This is the very essence of an allegation of a Franks violation. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-165 (1978) (Fourth Amendment requires not 
only a factual showing sufficient to establish probable cause, but also requires that the 
factual showing is truthful). 
While the normal procedure to establish a Franks violation is to hold a hearing to 
determine whether the information provided was material to the finding of probable 
cause, and was provided with either knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for 
truth, the need for a hearing in this case was obviated because the satisfaction of both 
prongs is apparent under the facts of this case. At the initial warrant hearing, the officer 
testified that another officer had personally observed the controlled drug buy at space 
23 of the mobile home park and had told the officer testifying that this location was 
where the drug buy occurred. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.1-24.) With 
no explanation for his prior representations, the officer then changed his testimony at 
the second warrant hearing, and this time stated that he had received the house 
number from the confidential informant. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing 
Tr., p.1, L.19 - p.L.12.) As articulated in the Appellant's Brief, this is a material 
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misrepresentation for which there is no reasonable explanation for this provision of false 
information short of reckless disregard for truth. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-23.) 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Belden respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful 
search of his residence. Additionally, Mr. Belden asks that this Court reverse his 
judgment of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2009. 
s~~~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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